Terrorist organizations in Nigeria, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), have escalated their unconventional warfare methods by employing drones to attack military personnel and facilities. Although this approach is not completely novel, it has become much more common recently.
In 2018, the then Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, disclosed that Boko Haram had started using drones and hired fighters in their attacks—a pattern he referred to as a significant security danger for Nigeria. Buratai mentioned: 'Over the past two to three months, we have observed bold actions by the terrorists, greater utilization of drones targeting our defensive positions, and the arrival of foreign combatants within their group. These strong threats demand that we constantly reassess our operations.'
Recently, on Tuesday, November 4, 2025, Lieutenant Colonel Sani Uba, the Media Information Officer for the Joint Task Force involved in the North East Operation HADIN KAI, stated that Boko Haram militants targeted the Kangar Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Mallam Fatori with drones and mortar fire directed at the base's defensive areas.
He mentioned that the troops effectively stopped the attackers. Lt. Col. Uba stated, "Although drones and indirect fire were initially used, the troops stood their ground, fighting fiercely against the terrorists with close air support from Nigerien Fighter Ground Attack aircraft. The terrorists, overwhelmed by the superior firepower and coordination of the combined force, withdrew in chaos into the waterways of the Tumbuns (islands), taking several of their wounded with them." This situation is concerning, as it shows how quickly terrorist groups in Nigeria are adjusting to modern military tactics following global trends. Over time, these groups have progressed from using knives to assault rifles—such as AK-47s and other automatic weapons—in ambushes and raids. They later obtained Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to attack armored vehicles and fortified positions, and eventually began using armored vehicles, often captured during attacks on Nigerian army bases and repurposed, including Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs).
They also started using machine guns and mortars for synchronized attacks, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on roads and in populated areas to hinder military operations and create terror, as well as equipping anti-aircraft guns on vehicles for both defense and attack. The deployment of drones represents a higher degree of skill and readiness, increasing the danger they present to the Nigerian armed forces.
The use of drones has elevated the difficulty of countering these groups to a higher degree. Boko Haram and ISWAP currently employ drones to survey military locations, track troop activities, and set up ambushes. More alarming is their capability to alter drones to carry explosives directly to targets, circumventing conventional defenses. Their extensive knowledge of the landscape and weaknesses within the military in the Northeast intensifies the danger. Moreover, drones might be utilized to interfere with military communications and hinder attempts to drive them out.
In response, Daily Trust calls on the Nigerian military to improve its aerial monitoring capabilities in order to prevent terrorists from gaining technological benefits. As part of its approach to combating insurgency, the military has prohibited the use of drones in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. Humanitarian groups and reporters working in these regions have encountered limitations on using drones for filming and taking pictures. Nevertheless, the effective use of this advanced weaponry by militants shows that existing efforts are inadequate. The military needs to expand its tactics by introducing counter-drone technology to interfere with terrorist drones before they can reach their objectives.
Only counter-drone technology is not sufficient. Nations part of the Multinational Joint Task Force need to work together to exchange information regarding the supply networks and outside assistance that insurgents get via trade routes in the Lake Chad Basin. Although weak borders have often been mentioned as a cause for Nigeria's failure to stop terrorist activities, it is now crucial to cooperate closely with Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger Republic to track and stop weapons from reaching terrorist groups. Improved surveillance patrols can greatly decrease the influx of illegal arms into Nigeria.
Several additional steps, if implemented, could hinder the movement of these weapons. The first is the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, which has been striving to trace illegal financial flows and oversee informal economies that support terrorist organizations. This organization needs to approach its responsibilities with seriousness in order to identify people and groups suspected of funding terrorism.
Additionally, Nigeria's connection with INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) should be strengthened, as this could enable Nigeria to obtain worldwide intelligence regarding the trafficking of arms and movements of terrorists. Military intelligence could obtain technology capable of monitoring online purchases of illegal weapons and communication devices. This approach might reveal groups and individuals in the Sahel region attempting to acquire advanced equipment for unlawful activities. The most basic step would be to encourage Nigerians in local communities to report any unusual acquisition of high-tech weapons so they can be stopped before being used.
Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (Syndigate.info).