Legally, the jurisdiction of the Hague-based Court of Arbitration in matters pertaining to the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is indisputable. Recently, the Court delivered a clear ruling: India is obligated to comply with the Treaty's provisions. However, the Court's recent Award, issued in response to Pakistan's 2023 case, does not address India's subsequent unilateral suspension of the Treaty. This omission rests on two key jurisdictional constraints: first, the case was initiated prior to India's suspension, and second, questions regarding the suspension or termination of the Treaty fall outside the Court's mandated purview.
Treaties are inherently binding during peacetime. The outbreak of war frequently leads to the termination or suspension of bilateral agreements. Many treaties incorporate explicit war clauses that automatically nullify the agreement upon the commencement of hostilities. The post-war fate of such agreements varies: they may be revived, renegotiated, or abandoned entirely if deemed unnecessary. Unless a treaty contains specific provisions to the contrary, it is generally understood that peacetime agreements are suspended or terminated during armed conflict, with their future determined by the subsequent state of relations.
This raises a critical question: what, then, is the legal status of the IWT following India's unilateral suspension prior to a formal declaration of war? Historically, the Treaty has demonstrated remarkable resilience, surviving multiple wars between India and Pakistan. Crucially, unlike many bilateral instruments, the IWT contains no war clause that would automatically void it during armed conflict. According to Article XII, the Treaty can only be modified or terminated by mutual consent of both parties-unilateral withdrawal is not a legally permissible action. Even the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is difficult to invoke, as the occurrence of war alone does not typically constitute valid grounds for termination.
Consequently, India's unilateral withdrawal remains legally untenable. If a party seeks to exit the Treaty, it must demonstrably prove either a material breach by the other side or a fundamental change in circumstances that radically transforms the obligations still to be performed. Issuing a couple of Notices to negotiate does not, ipso facto, confer the right to unilaterally place the Treaty in abeyance. The spirit and letter of the Treaty demand that any such action be taken by 'mutual consent'.
A historical review reveals a pattern of Indian disregard for the Treaty's three-tier dispute resolution mechanism. Barring a few reluctant concessions, India has consistently tested the limits of the IWT's provisions. Neither the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), rulings from Arbitration Courts, nor determinations by Neutral Experts have deterred India from advancing controversial hydroelectric projects. From Salal to Baglihar, and Kishanganga to Ratle, New Delhi has pushed the Treaty's limits with impunity. Its recent refusal to recognise the authority of the latest Arbitration Court ruling, therefore, is not surprising.
India's suspension of the Treaty must not be examined through legal technicalities alone. For decades, New Delhi has manipulated the IWT to advance its strategic interests. Its current decision to suspend the Treaty is rooted not in sound legal reasoning but in political expediency. The 2016 Uri attack and subsequent 'false flag' operations, including Pahalgam, provided a pretext for a hardened stance. With domestic sentiment inflamed by recent conflicts and the political fallout from Operation Sindoor, no Indian government could reverse this decision without facing severe political backlash. Despite well-intentioned appeals from Pakistani analysts for India to uphold the Treaty, New Delhi is unlikely to retreat from its suspension-a stance mirroring its ostensibly irreversible position on the abrogation of Article 370. For any Indian political party, including the less hawkish Congress, such a reversal would amount to political suicide.
Hopes for external mediation are equally misplaced. The United States, while monitoring Indo-Pakistani tensions, prioritises preventing outright war over mediating specific disputes. Furthermore, any significant leverage Washington might once have had over New Delhi is negligible, particularly amid ongoing trade tensions. Expecting the US to influence India on a sensitive bilateral matter such as the IWT is wishful thinking; Washington's primary concern is maintaining the ceasefire, not addressing the underlying causes of instability.
Similarly, China, despite its strategic rivalry with India, is unlikely to intervene decisively. Beijing has recently resumed border trade talks with New Delhi, and the latter has claimed 'steady progress' in improving bilateral relations, emphasising a new, albeit cautious, respect for each other's core interests. In international relations, there are no permanent friends or foes, only permanent interests.
Revisiting the past offers limited utility. Debating the historical compulsions that led Pakistan to sign the Treaty in 1960 is, therefore, an exercise in futility. The IWT was the best possible outcome at the time, and its endurance through past conflicts underscores its strategic value. However, today's geopolitical realities, characterised by open hostilities and India's assertive unilateralism, suggest that salvaging the Treaty in its original form is not possible.
The harsh truth is that the IWT has transcended its technical and legal origins. It has morphed into a profound political dispute, deeply entangled within the broader Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Legal mechanisms alone cannot resolve this deadlock. With both nations locked in a cycle of threats and counter-threats, tensions are poised to escalate. Pakistan has no choice but to stand firm. China's rising influence-particularly after Trump and Putin met in Alaska-is notable. However, this enthusiasm must be tempered with realism. Pakistan must prepare for any eventuality, as India itself is running out of manageable options. The region can only wait to see when India steps back from the brink. In the meantime, the crumbling IWT has quietly added another intractable 'core issue' to an already fraught bilateral agenda.
Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (Syndigate.info).